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I derive Ramsey optimal prices in one−way access of long−distance operators and enhanced
service providers to local loops. As long−distance services and enhanced services become
substitutes due to the advance of Internet telephony, the Ramsey principle requires higher
access charges assessed on both services. I also derive Ramsey prices in two−way
interconnection between fixed−link and mobile phone networks, which turn out to be
formally equivalent to those for the one−way access above. This result suggests that the price
of fixed−to−mobile calls should be higher than the price of mobile−to−fixed calls when the
substitutability of calls to double subscribers is more prominent than the substitutability of
calls of double subscribers, and vice versa.
Citation: Jeon, Seonghoon, (2002) "Ramsey pricing in one−way and two−way interconnection between telephone networks."
Economics Bulletin, Vol. 12, No. 3 pp. 1−9





1.  Introduction 
 
     The principle of Ramsey optimal pricing is to meet the regulated operator’s break-
even requirement with the least possible distortions of prices.  It is very relevant to 
telecommunications pricing since the recovery of large fixed costs in local loop services 
has been primary concerns.  The local loop deficit should be covered by mark-ups of 
various services involved.  The involved services include long-distance services, 
enhanced services such as Internet services, and mobile phone services as well as local 
telephone services.  Under the market configuration where the fixed-link local service is 
supplied by a regulated monopolist, and all other services are provided competitively, 
the Ramsey principle provides the second-best optimal solution for those prices.       
  The models of one-way access and two-way interconnection are two conceptual 
frameworks with which we can address relationships among telephone services.   In 
one-way access, one company needs access to the other, but the reverse does not hold.  
The examples are the access of long-distance carriers and Internet service providers to 
local loops.   Laffont-Tirole(1996) characterized Ramsey prices in the model of one-
way supply of access by a vertically integrated monopolist to downstream new entrants 
in long-distance market.   In the paper, I extend their set-up to consider an additional 
downstream service such as on-line or Internet service providers.  An insight obtained 
additionally is that higher access charges should be a ssessed on long-distance and 
enhanced services as two services become more substitutable, for example, due to the 
advance of Internet telephony.   
      In two-way interconnection, customers calling each other belong to two different 
networks, such as fixed-link and mobile phone networks.  In this case, each network can 
be an access-provider to the other network for calls that it terminates on its network.  I 
derive Ramsey prices of four differently directed calls between fixed and mobile 
networks.  Incidentally, the formulas are formally equivalent to those for the above one-
way access.  The isomorphism is remarkable in that two frameworks have different 
contexts.  Disregarding other factors that affect Ramsey optimal prices, we may say that 
the price of fixed-to-mobile calls should be higher than the price of mobile-to-fixed 
calls when the substitutability of calls to double subscribers is more prominent than the 
substitutability of calls of double subscribers, and vice versa.  
     The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 derives Ramsey prices 
for one-way access of long-distance and on-line services to local loops, and discusses 
the implications.  Section 3 does the same work for two-way interconnection between 
fixed-link and mobile phone networks.  Section 4 concludes by making remarks on the 
relevance of the model to regulatory realities. 
 
2. Ramsey Pricing in One-way Interconnection 
 
 We consider four operators: 0 and 1 represent the local and long-distance division, 
respectively, of an incumbent telephone company, 2 refers to a group of new entrants in 
the long-distance market, and 3 represents a collection of enhanced service providers.
1   
                                                                 
1 The incumbent firm is a vertically integrated local monopolist that provides local and long-distance 
services.  The model can be adapted into the case in which the incumbent provides only local services 




Denoting each operator’s quantity and price by  i q  and  i p , demand and cost functions 
are simplified as follows:  
  ) ( 0 0 0 p q q = ,       ) , , ( 3 2 1 p p p q q i i = ,   3 , 2 , 1 = i ;        (1) 
  ) ( 3 2 1 0 0 0 q q q q c C + + + = 0 k + ,  i i i q c C = ,  3 , 2 , 1 = i .        (2) 
Specification (1) assumes that demand for local call services is independent, while 
demands for long-distance and on-line services are interrelated.  It is implicit in (2) that 
a unit of local call service is essential in providing long-distance and on-line services.   
Operator 2  and 3 pay access charges,  2 a  and  3 a , respectively, to the incumbent 
company for supplying access to local loop services.
2  Specification (2) assumes that 
marginal costs,  i c ( 3 , 2 , 1 , 0 = i ), are constant, and that only local call services incur fixed 
costs  0 k .
3   I assume that markets for long-distance and on-line services are competitive, 
which implies: 
    2 2 2 c a p + = ,  3 3 3 c a p + = .                (3) 
    The regulator controls the prices that the incumbent charges on final consumers, and 
other operators in such a way that maximizes social welfare subject to the constraint of 
zero-profit of the incumbent.  I.e. the regulator solves the following optimization 
program: 
       Max     ) ( 0 0 q V ) , , ( 3 2 1 q q q V + 3 3 2 2 1 1 0 3 2 1 0 0 ) ( q c q c q c k q q q q c - - - - + + + -  
  . . . t r w   3 2 1 0 , , , a a p p  
    . .t s         3 3 2 2 1 1 0 0 q a q a q p q p + + + 1 1 0 3 2 1 0 0 ) ( q c k q q q q c - - + + + - .        (4) 
In program (4),  0 V  and  V  denote the social values of telephone services; the 
separability of the former and the interrelationship in the latter reflect the demand 
structure in (1).   This program is an application of the well-known Ramsey principle.    
Substituting (3) into the constraint of (4), and applying the Lagrangean method, we can 
reduce it into: 
          Max     ) ( 0 0 q V ) , , ( 3 2 1 q q q V + ) ( 3 3 2 2 2 1 0 0 q p q p q p q p + + + +l  
} ) ( ){ 1 ( 3 3 2 2 1 1 0 3 2 1 0 0 q c q c q c k q q q q c + + + + + + + + - l  
           . . . t r w     3 2 1 0 , , , p p p p .                    (5) 
Multiplier l reflects the social premium for the incumbent company’s profit, which 
stems from the fact that the subsidy to make up its losses should be covered by 
distorting taxes.   























” h ,   = i  0,1,2,3,   = „ ) ( i j 0,1,2,3.        (6) 
Then, we can derive the optimal prices according to Ramsey principle as follows: 
 
















( = i  1,2,3).   Then, 
                                                                 
2 Currently, enhanced service providers do not pay access charges in most of the countries.  This policy is 
to promote the development of enhanced telecom services.  But, at some point, they should, and will, 
share the large fixed costs of building telecom infrastructure.  
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[Proof:  Equation (7) is the standard inverse-elasticity rule.  To derive (8), (9), and (10), 
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                  (11) 
Then, we can solve  i p  ( = i 1, 2, 3) with Crammer’s rule.  Expressing them in terms of 
elasticities (6), we have (8), (9), and (10).    Q.E.D.] 
 
The assumption of  i i p q V = ¶ ¶  is the requirement of prices reflecting marginal social 
values of services. 
    These are the extension of what Laffont-Tirole(1996) obtained for the case of only 
one type of competitive access-users such as long-distance companies.   For example, if 
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which is what they derived.   It says that  2
~ p  should be higher than the level according to 
the simple inverse elasticity rule, 
2 ) 1 ( h l
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and new entrants are substitutes, i.e.,  0 21 > h .  That is, the increase in  2 p  is more 
tolerable because the consequent reduction in  2 q  is somewhat compensated by the 
accompanying increase in  1 q .    
 Comparison between (9) and (12) reveals that the existence of another related service 
makes it necessary to consider many other interrelationships.   First of all, the inclusion 
of  23 h  in the numerator of (9) reflects the effect of change in  2 p  on demand for  3 q .   If 
23 h > 0, then  2 p  should be even higher than the level according to (12).   Moreover, the 
numerator of (9) includes the terms that show indirect effects,  31 23h h  and  13 21h h .   The 
former shows the indirect effect of change in  2 p  on demand for  1 q  via the change in 
demand for  3 q , while the latter shows the indirect effect of change in  2 p  on demand for 
3 q  via the change in demand for  1 q .  When  0 31 > h  and  0 13 > h , these indirect effects 
reinforce the direct effects due to the relationship of substitutes.   The following 
corollary summarizes the comparison between (9) and (12). 
 
Corollary 1.   Suppose  0 > ij h ,  3 , 2 , 1 = i ,  3 , 2 , 1 ) ( = „i j .  Then,  2 2
~ p p > . 
 
Given condition (3), the practical implication is that when long-distance and enhanced 
services become substitutes due to the advance of Internet telephony, the Ramsey 
principle requires higher access charges assessed on both services.   
   What if long-distance and enhanced services are complementary whatever the 
reason?  Do we expect the reverse result with  2 2
~ p p < if all of   23 h ,  32 h ,  13 h , and  31 h  are 
negative?   Formula (9) implies that it is not always the case.   We have factors that 
induce  2 2
~ p p < : i.e.,  0 23 < h  and  0 13 21 < h h  in the numerator of (9).  However, there also 
exists a countervailing factor,  0 31 23 > h h .   This indirect effect captures the following 
chain of reactions:  ￿ › 2 p   ￿ ﬂ
D q3 ￿ ﬂ 3 p ›
D q1 .   A chain of two complementary 
relationships results in substitute effect.  This countervailing substitute effect may not 
be negligible if the incumbent’s revenue of  1 1q p  is important.   This exercise shows that 
the extension of Ramsey formulas to the case of two types of competitive access-users 
is not trivial; it is useful in understanding indirect effects clearly.  
 
3. Ramsey Pricing in Two-way Interconnection 
 
   The following Figure 1 describes the structure of two-way interconnection between 
fixed and mobile networks.  Let  ) , ( 1 1 q p ,  ) , ( 2 2 q p ,  ) , ( 3 3 q p , and  ) , ( 4 4 q p  represent 
prices and quantities for fixed-to-fixed, fixed-to-mobile, mobile-to-fixed, and mobile-to-
mobile calls, respectively.  L et  f c  and  m c denote marginal operating costs of 
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   Then, I specify demand and cost functions as follows: 
  ) , , , ( 4 3 2 1 p p p p q q i i = ,     4 , 3 , 2 , 1 = i ;                    (13) 
  ) ( 2 3 2 1 q q c q c C f f f + + = f k + ,  4 3 2 2 ) ( q c q q c C m m m + + = .                (14) 
Demands are interrelated.  I assume that only fixed network incurs fixed costs  f k .
4  Let 
f a  and  m a  denote the access charge that one network assesses to the other network for 
completing a call. In case of off-net calls such as mobile-to-fixed calls  3 q , mobile 
network’s perceived marginal costs are  f m a c + , even though the relevant social costs 
are  f m c c + .   I assume that the mobile service market is perfectly competitive, which 
implies: 
  f m a c p + = 3 ,    m c p 2 4 = ,      m m c a =                     (15) 
    The program that the regulator should solve for Ramsey optimal prices is: 
Max  f m f m m f f k q c q c c q c c q c q q q q U - - + - + - - 4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 2 ) ( ) ( 2 ) , , , (  
 w.r.t.    f a p p , , 2 1    
 s.t.        0 ) ( 2 3 2 1 3 2 2 1 1 = - - + - - + + f f m f f f k q c q a c q c q a q p q p                  (16) 
U  is the social value for four interrelated call services. Plug  m f c p a - = 3  and 
m m c a = in (15) into (16), and apply the Lagrangean method.   Then, we have: 
Max  ) , , , ( 4 3 2 1 q q q q U ) ( 3 3 2 2 1 1 q p q p q p + + +m  
} ) ( ) ( 2 ){ 1 ( 3 2 1 f f m m f f k q c c q c c q c - + + + + + - m 4 2 q cm -  
w.r.t.    3 2 1 , , p p p                             (17) 
Langrangean multiplier  m reflects the social premium for the fixed-line network 
operator’s revenues.    
                                                                 
4 I ignore fixed costs of mobile operators, which are relatively insignificant.  Moreover, mobile operators 
are more flexible in recovering fixed costs by fixed monthly fees. 
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   The Ramsey optimal solution is: 
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         (21) 
Simplify equation (21) by substituting  m c p 2 4 =  in (15).  Then, we can solve  i p  ( = i 1, 
2, 3) with Crammer’s rule.  Expressing them in terms of elasticities (6), we have 
formulas (18), (19), and (20).    Q.E.D.] 
 
    The results of Proposition 1 and 2 are formally equivalent.  There exists a common 
factor in the two set-ups; the fixed local loop services are under regulated monopoly, 
while other services connected to the local loops, such as long-distance and enhanced 
services in the case of one-way interconnection, and mobile services in the case of two-
way interconnection, are competitive. This common feature explains the isomorphism 
between the two results.  However, considering the differences in the underlying 
contexts of one-way and two-way interconnections, the equivalence is notable at least. 
    The formulas in (18), (19), and (20) are very complicated.  But, demand analyses may 
be useful in obtaining their implications.  Jeon(2000) identified two kinds of 
substitutability between calls in fixed and mobile interconnection:  substitutability 




subscribers.   Double subscribers refer to persons who have both fixed-link and mobile 
phones.  Then, the former means that when people place calls to double subscribers, 
their calls to double subscribers’ fixed-link phones and their calls to double subscribers’ 
mobile phones are somewhat substitutable.  On the other hand, the latter means that 
when double subscribers place calls to other people, fixed phone calls  of double 
subscribers to others and mobile phone calls  of double subscribers to others are 
somewhat substitutable.   The former implies  0 12 > h  and  0 21 > h , while the latter 
implies  0 13 > h  and  0 31 > h .  To obtain the ramifications on optimal prices of 
substitutability between calls to double subscribers, suppose the following 
simplification: 
  0 12 > h ,  0 21 > h ,    0 13 = h ,  0 31 = h ,  0 23 = h ,  0 32 = h .
5 





































We can implement the symmetric exercise to obtain the implication of substitutability 
between calls of double subscribers.   The following corollary summarizes the 
discussion. 
 
Corollary 2.  Suppose    0 12 > h ,  0 21 > h ,  0 13 = h ,  0 31 = h , 0 23 = h ,  0 32 = h , and  3 2 h h = .  
Then, we have  3 2 p p > .   On the other hand, suppose  0 12 = h ,  0 21 = h ,  0 13 > h , 
0 31 > h , 0 23 = h ,  0 32 = h , and  3 2 h h = .  Then, we have  3 2 p p < . 
 
This result may be read as follows.  Controlling other factors that affect optimal prices, 
the price of fixed-to-mobile calls should be higher than the price of mobile-to-fixed 
calls when substitutability of calls to double subscribers is more prominent than 
substitutability of calls of double subscribers, and vice versa. 
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
    In deriving Ramsey optimal prices, the paper presumed the market configuration in 
which the fixed local services are supplied under regulated monopoly, while other 
services are provided competitively.   Even though the current discussion of local 
competition is very active, most of local service markets are still under monopoly.   
Moreover, the current deregulatory trend into price caps does not make Ramsey prices 
irrelevant.  In fact, direct implementation of Ramsey prices by regulatory authority is 
impossible, which is hinted by the complexity of the formulas in this paper.   Ramsey 
pricing is essentially business oriented as noted by Laffont-Tirole(1999, p.63); “the 
                                                                 
5 Jeon(2001) shows that network externalities work to make all kinds of calls complementary.  That is, 
network externalities countervail substitutability.  I disregard the effect of network externalities in this 




Ramsey-Boiteux prices are the same as those of an unregulated monopolist, just a notch 
down. We will therefore say that Ramsey-Boiteux prices are business oriented.”   So, as 
liberalization goes on, we may expect that the structure of Ramsey prices will 
approximate actual prices more closely.   Finally, long-distance and mobile service 
markets may not be perfectly competitive.  The Ramsey prices for those services should 
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